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Abstract.  This article provides commentary on an essay written by Mr. Walt Jajko.  Mr. Jajko’s essay was 
itself a commentary on an article published in the book, Strategic Denial and Deception, the Twenty First 
Century Challenge, that was edited by Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz and published by Transaction 
Publishers (2002). 
 
Mr. Jajko was formerly assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight and director, 
Special Advisory Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within the United States 
Government (USG). 
 
Commentary. 
 
Government Type.  The very title fragment, “Conditions for Denial and Deception Success and Failure in 
Democratic Regimes,” implies that there are structural, functional, and process differences between and 
among governmental types that impact on the consequences of denial and deception programs.  An 
implicit hypothesis accompanying the above premise is that there are unique psychological effects on 
political authorities (as denial and deception initiators, targets, and observers) from various 
governmental types that have consequences for denial and deception success and failure.  These effects 
may most commonly be associated with (1) the very perception of threat against one’s government 
regime from within and external to that regime; (2) thresholds of perceived threat bearing on the need 
for action; (3) accepted modes of acting against threat, including the acceptability of engaging in denial 
and deception; (4) expected consequences for political authorities contingent on denial and deception 
success and failure; and (5) accepted life styles of political authorities and their representatives including 
the prioritization of official, unofficial, and personal goals bearing on how time is acceptably fragmented 
among these goals. 
 
A broader variant of the premise of psychological differences between and among governmental types 
encompasses the constructs of national and ethnic character.  Do such constructs, as well as those 
constrained to government type-induced psychological differences, bear some sort of ontological 
validity?  If not, are beliefs in such constructs associated with some sort of instrumental effectiveness or 
even evolutionary adaptiveness?  Unfortunately, common epistemological approached to knowledge, 
reason, logic, faith, authority, and empiricism are accompanied by many epistemological vulnerabilities 
and may not yield the certainty on which a prolegomenon or primer on denial and deception might be 
founded. 
 
(One further Issue as to the salience and import of government type for denial and deception may be 
the non-psychological but equally significant hypothesis that the structure, function, and process of 
government might only allow certain denial and deception initiatives to rise to the top for approval, 
implementation, and evaluation, regardless of any concurrent and epiphenomenal psychological 
consequences elicited by government type.) 
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Characteristics of Deception Officers.  Mr. Jajko’s commentary focuses on an assertion of another author 
that deception officers may be more successful if they share a “single cohesive social class.”  Mr. Jajko 
asserts that there are more important characteristics associated with successful deception, viz., flexible 
and imaginative minds intuiting options that conventional minds could not even conceive and the 
understanding of how the enemy thinks. 
 
As a point of departure, both Mr. Jajko and the author whom he critiques share a birds of a feather 
perspective but differ in the nature of birds and feathers. 
 
For example, a “single cohesive social class” has much to recommend it.  One might posit that, for a 
deception planning team, class identity attenuates disruptive behavioral differences, nurtures a sense of 
unity of purpose and being on a team, and precludes demonization and ostracization of individuals who 
present minority opinions.  Moreover, class and class identity may be directly or indirectly correlated 
with the very opportunities and experiences that are, in turn, correlated or even cause deception 
success. 
 
On the downside, class identity may preclude or minimize the testing of limits and the capability of going 
and the motivation to go beyond the mundane.  In fact, if class identity is associated with degrees of 
access to material and other psychological and social benefits as perceived by all in a populace 
represented or controlled by a government, constraints on options that risk one’s high standing or 
mobility upward from a low standing as to possession of such benefits may ineluctably impede 
deception success. 
 
In contrast to class hypotheses, advocacy for flexibility, imagination, and intuiting of the uncommon 
elicit significant face validity.  Without seeking to be merely contrarian, however, one might find less 
than what first meets the eye in such advocacy. 
 
For example, cognitive flexibility and the like are at times conceived as primary symptoms of serious 
psychiatric disorder even constituting variants of psychosis.  It is the very flexibility and uncommonness 
that land the bearer of such characteristics in a stigmatized and otherwise problematic position. 
 
Even without approaching psychiatric status, one might still bear the brunt of stigmatization in the 
groupwork of deception planning.  This is because each individual within the group might well exhibit 
flexibility and uncommonness in different ways.  Some individuals would be closer in flexibility and 
uncommonness to each other than other individuals.  Majority and minority positions even on flexibility 
and uncommonness would be experienced.  The groupthink of groupwork would then work to 
stigmatize the fruits of minority flexibility and uncommonness, much as majority inflexibility and 
commonness in the larger world would stigmatize flexibility and uncommonness in general. 
 
As to the positive value and desirability of understanding how the enemy thinks, one might counter with 
several points. 
 
First, one is limited to attempting to predict how the enemy behaves, because thinking is a privileged, 
internal phenomenon that one might futilely infer about others in that these others may often enough 
not even have conscious access to what they, indeed, think.  Or even if one somehow acquires access to 
enemy thought, such thought may not be linked with relevant enemy behavior. 
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Second, the selection characteristic (for deception planners) of understanding how the enemy thinks is 
less a characteristic than a consequence of characteristics.  The usual suspects for such characteristics 
include empathy and intuition.  These characteristics are themselves characterized by multiple 
definitions and measurement procedures and often enough are conflated with the consequence of 
predicting behavior so as to form a circular sequence of causal attribution, e.g., possessing empathy 
because the behavior one predicted occurred and predicting because of possessing the putative 
characteristic of empathy. 
 
Third, one might state that an enemy behavior will occur and it does, indeed, occur.  However, the 
appearance of the enemy behavior may not have been predicted at all but merely coincidental.  
(Incidentally, this line of reasoning is similar to that of Sigmund Freud’s counter to the premise of 
dreams predicting the future in The Interpretation of Dreams wherein a certain percentage of what is 
dreamt should be expected to occur based on relevant behavioral base rates. 
 
Thus, as with assertions concerning government types, those assertions addressing deception planners, 
characteristics are still open to rigorous debate. 
 
Deception and Values.  Perhaps most importantly for the study of denial and deception is Mr. Jajko’s 
analysis of values linked to each activity, especially deception.  His analysis focuses on two classes of 
values.  The first embraces deception as often highly effective but morally and ethically suspect.  The 
moral and ethical taint may be deontological in nature, based on some intrinsic badness of deception 
and human intention to engage in it.  Such a taint should logically preclude any deception practice or 
only allow it in exceptional cases.  The moral and ethical taint also may be related to a variant of 
postmodern and relativist critique through which most if not all threats are as equally valid or benign as 
those from which we seek to protect, thus precluding the need to effect deception.  Or the taint may 
arise through the belief that deception is only for the weak and, thus, one can only engage in deception 
if one is weak or believes one is weak, a belief that constrains the maintenance of political power among 
the strong and those who believe themselves to be strong.  As a praxis-based counter to all examples of 
taint and to the whole class of values maligning deception, one should note that the same people who 
decry political deception in matters affecting the collective good and even the life and death of the 
collective engage in the individual politics of deception in matters affecting their own personal and 
social lives. 
 
The second class of values encompasses perceptions that deception is not effective or is unknowable as 
to its effectiveness.  Rationales for this class include the vast number of variables contributing to the 
multi-determination of most behavior and the seeming impossibility of validly assessing all possible 
contributing variables that might contribute or have contributed to behavior.  Here the bureaucratic 
psychology of deception planners may come into play.  Desired enemy behavior that occurs is 
associated with implemented deception plans, while undesirable enemy behavior that occurs would 
have been worse without deception planning or has nothing to do with the deception plan. 
 
Again, rigorous debate remains to inform on the appropriate value of denial and deception.  Following 
Nietzsche, to claim that there is no Universal Truth does not mean that there are no truths or that all 
truths are equivalent. 
 
Terror Management and Deception.  Mr. Jajko makes a number of astute observations in describing the 
problematics of deception as a tool of USG foreign policy.  There are, indeed, few if any career pathways 
for deception planners.  The few planners attempting such a pathway often are looked at as culturally 
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and even psychologically deviant.  Deception activities do seem to require enormous intricacy as to 
staffing and coordination.  The long-term nature of strategic deception may well be fatally incompatible 
with how political and military officers are rewarded and punished through promotions, awards, or the 
lack thereof.  It may well be easier to kill than to deceive, and killing or deterring/containing through the 
threat of killing (the last, paradoxically, a valuable opportunity and permeable venue for deception 
planning) has always been a sine qua non of strategic power and politics.  There is a conceptual fuzziness 
to the nature of counterintelligence and its linkage to deception-related constituents.  Lip service to 
deception in official security- and intelligence-related documents do far surpass praxis. 
 
Yet a final observation concerning deception that is not made by Mr. Jajko may even be more important 
than an analysis of deception and values.  It may turn out that the very language we use to describe our 
world may have no correspondence to the nature of the world.  Instead there are competing narratives 
about the world that relate to instrumental value and adaptiveness, not deception itself.  As described 
earlier in this article, the notion of competing narratives is not necessarily an argument for cognitive 
relativism, because there may well be Truth, Good, and Right for each individual, not necessarily all 
individuals.  In fact, people may choose to believe as a means of avoiding the existential terror of openly 
perceiving the world as potentially unknowable or unpredictable or meaningless. By this perspective, 
belief in the viability of deception for political power may be the biggest deception of all.  This should by 
no means dissuade from believing in the value of denial and deception.  It might, however, attenuate 
internecine battles concerning the value of deception in the abstract or in managing the threat and 
opportunity of political power through denial and deception for the security of what one believes to be 
True, Good, and Right.  (See Heinrich, C.U., & Borkenau, P.  (1998).  Deception and deception detection: 
The role of cross-modal inconsistency.  Journal of Personality, 66, 687-712; Jajko, W.  (2002).  Conditions 
making for success and failures of denial and deception: Democratic Regimes.  In R. Godson & J.J. Wirtz. 
(Eds.).  Strategic denial and deception, the Twenty First Century Challenge.  Transaction Publishers; 
Metcalfe, J.  (1998).  Cognitive optimism: Self-deception or memory-based processing heuristics?  
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2, 100-110; Ratner, N. K., & Olver, R.R.  (1998).  Reading a tale 
of deception, learning a theory of mind?  Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 13, 219-239; Tuckett, A.  
(1998).  “Bending the truth:” professionals, narratives about lying and deception in nursing practice.  
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 35, 292-302.)   (Keywords: Deception, Denial, Jajko.) 
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